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To the Editors (Alex J. Bellamy writes):
In a recently published piece, Robert Pape makes some misleading and erroneous com-
ments on my published work.1 First, Pape writes, “Alex Bellamy, a staunch advocate of
R2P [the responsibility to protect initiative], catalogues episodes of mass atrocities to
clarify ‘R2P’s preventive agenda,’ with a total of twenty-one qualifying for intervention
from 1990 to 2010” (p. 212). Pape provides no reference to support this statement. In
truth, I have never produced a list of “cases” that “qualiªed” for intervention. The
datasets that I have produced relate to cases where the lowest casualty estimates sug-
gest that at least 5,000 noncombatants were intentionally killed. Nowhere have I sug-
gested that this “qualiªes” these cases for intervention. Actually, I have been generally
critical of abstract talk about criteria and thresholds for armed intervention, as well as
the pervasive and erroneous tendency to treat R2P as synonymous with humanitarian
intervention, both of which I believe to be disconnected from political realities.2 Since I
began working on R2P a decade ago, I have repeatedly expressed caution about the use
of force for protection purposes for reasons similar to those aired by Pape last year.3 In
my ªrst book on R2P, I concluded that “non-consensual force is a highly unreliable
form of protection.”4
Second, Pape claims that my dataset includes “virtually all instances of armed
conºict around the world” during the 1990–2010 period (p. 213) and that, because of
this, “one can reasonably wonder whether there are any meaningful limits to R2P”
(p. 213). In this respect, it bears repeating that I have never compiled a list of cases that
“qualiªed” for “intervention” or for which R2P “obligates” such action. Moreover, the
claim that a set of twenty-one cases of mass killing spread over twenty years includes
“virtually all instances of armed conºict” during this period is clearly untrue. To take
just one example, the Uppsala Conºict Data Project’s dataset identiªes approximately
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165 armed conºicts during this same period.5 Clearly, my own dataset of mass atrocities
covers just a small portion.6
I appreciate this opportunity to correct the record.
—Alex J. Bellamy
South East Queensland, Australia
Robert A. Pape Replies:
Reading Alex Bellamy’s letter, it is refreshing to know that both Bellamy and I are skep-
tical about the value of armed intervention in many cases.1 The real disagreement
appears to be about whether Bellamy’s very good data on mass atrocities reºect respon-
sibility to protect (R2P) principles for intervention. Even if he does not speciªcally qual-
ify each case in this manner, my use of his dataset of mass atrocities as a set of cases that
would qualify for intervention according to the standards of R2P is perfectly appropri-
ate. Let me explain.
Bellamy’s dataset contains a list of mass atrocities that, in principle, would trigger the
international community’s responsibility to protect. Speciªcally, to better understand
their context, Bellamy collected a dataset of “episodes of mass killing deªned as a mini-
mum of 5,000 civilians killed intentionally.” Most of these episodes occurred during
armed conºict, but some did take place in peacetime. Using this dataset, Bellamy then
goes on to argue that “atrocity prevention requires tailored engagement that targets both
peacetime atrocities and those committed within a context of armed conºict.”2
True, Bellamy never describes the measures that should have been taken in particu-
lar cases and whether his dataset is the complete list of events that would trigger R2P.
Further, he would prefer to use nonmilitary measures to prevent atrocities before they
occur—provided these nonmilitary measures actually work.
Bellamy, however, also expects that in some cases nonmilitary measures will fail and
armed intervention will be necessary. In 2009 he wrote, “When non-military ways are
unable to protect endangered civilians . . . R2P calls for the deployment of military
force. Military force can be used either to protect populations from attack or to coerce or
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compel compliance by targeting those responsible for attacks on civilians.”3 Similarly,
in 2012 he stated, “Sadly, preventive efforts will not always succeed. That is why the in-
ternational community must be prepared to take timely and decisive action, using all
the measures placed at its disposal by Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter,
when it is needed to protect populations. . . . Without the use of force in the R2P toolkit,
the international community would effectively need to rely on the perpetrators to de-
liver protection. That option is unconscionable.”4
Bellamy has repeatedly argued for robust military capabilities for armed interven-
tion, both to defend the intervention forces themselves in a combat environment and to
protect civilians. He writes, “[T]he protection of civilians by peacekeepers . . . entails co-
ercive protection—the positioning of military forces between the civilian population
and those that threaten them. This may involve military measures to defeat and elimi-
nate armed groups that threaten civilians. . . . Sometimes, coercive protection may
involve measures short of force such as erecting military barriers around civilian popu-
lations and the gradual removal of threats through negotiated (and sometimes coerced)
disarmament.”5
Finally, when armed intervention is needed, Bellamy believes that R2P criteria are
important. He notes, “We should not be lulled into thinking that there will not be cases
in the future where non-consensual force is necessary. In such cases, the criteria set out
by the ICISS [aka R2P] might help to guide the debate.”6
In sum, Bellamy’s dataset is a list of mass atrocities that would qualify for interven-
tion by R2P standards, obligating international action ªrst to prevent and then to stop
them via armed intervention if prevention fails. If Bellamy or other proponents of
R2P truly disagree, there is a simple response—identify the cases of mass atrocities
since 1990 in which R2P would not demand armed intervention if nonmilitary policies
failed to stop them in the ªrst place. Deciding which cases of mass atrocities do and do
not merit intervention is a core purpose of my article on the pragmatic standard of hu-
manitarian intervention. Our agreement on past cases should help focus the attention
of the international community on the moral purpose of saving lives, even as we reason
through how our standards would reach similar empirical positions.
—Robert A. Pape
Chicago, Illinois
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CORRECTION: In Avery Goldstein’s spring 2013 article, “First Things First: The
Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” the label in the lower left
cell in ªgure 1 should be “very unstable.”
